Abstract. We study dynamic optimal portfolio allocation for monotone mean-variance preferences in a general semimartingale model. Armed with new results in this area we revisit the work of Cui et al. (2012) and fully characterize the circumstances under which one can set aside a non-negative cash flow while simultaneously improving the meanvariance efficiency of the left-over wealth. The paper analyzes, for the first time, the monotone hull of the Sharpe ratio and highlights its relevance to the problem at hand.
Introduction
In a recent work Cui et al. (2012) study an interesting situation where one can enhance the performance of a dynamically mean-variance efficient portfolio by setting aside a nonnegative cash flow without lowering the Sharpe ratio of the remaining wealth distribution. Noting that mean-variance (MV) preferences are not time-consistent, Cui et al. (2012) devise a new concept called time consistency in efficiency which allows one to judge whether one can extract a 'free cash flow stream' (FCFS) without affecting the efficiency of the mean-variance portfolio allocation. Their analysis is performed mostly in discrete time with square-integrable price processes whose returns are independent, but the authors also note that FCFS extraction is not possible in a continuous-time lognormal diffusion model. In subsequent work Bäuerle and Grether (2015) indicate that the FCFS extraction is not possible in any (suitably defined) complete market.
In this paper we approach the same subject along more classical lines to deepen the foregoing analysis both mathematically and conceptually. First, we consider a general semimartingale model with only a mild σ-local square integrability condition on the price process. Second, we note that the extraction of FCFS for MV preferences can be fully understood by studying a simpler time-consistent expected utility maximization, which shows that any link between the existence of FCFS and time inconsistency of MV preferences is accidental.
Our strategy, in the first instance, is to link the existence of FCFS to portfolio maximization with monotone mean-variance preferences (MMV). In the second step we exploit a connection between the MMV preferences and the truncated quadratic utility whose individual ingredients have appeared in the work ofČerný (2003) , Ben-Tal and Teboulle (2007) , Filipović and Kupper (2007) , Maccheroni et al. (2009 Maccheroni et al. ( ), andČerný et al. (2012 . We provide a novel and systematic treatment of this connection which is of independent interest. As a by-product we then obtain an extension of the monotone mean-variance optimal portfolio analysis of Maccheroni et al. (2009) to semimartingale trading.
In the general semimartingale setting outlined above we prove that it is possible to extract an FCFS while maintaining MV efficiency if and only if one can extract an FCFS and strictly improve MV efficiency (Theorem 5.3). Our work explicitly characterizes the upper limit of MV efficiency gain in terms of the monotone hull of the Sharpe ratio (SR). In Proposition 4.1 the monotone SR is shown to coincide, on an appropriate set, with the arbitrage-adjusted Sharpe ratio ofČerný (2003).
Mathematical setup
2.1. Monotone mean-variance preferences. Fix a time horizon T > 0. We shall work on a filtered probability space (Ω, (F t 
+ for the set of non-negative random variables in L p . All probabilistic statements hold 'P-almost surely'.
Let U : R → R be the normalized quadratic utility
Define the expected utility functional F :
Observe that F is a proper and concave function on L 0 . The effective domain of a concave function f on L 0 is defined in the standard way as
In particular, we obtain dom F = L 2 . Next, denote by F m and F MV the monotone and the cash-invariant hull of F , respectively, cf. Filipović and Kupper (2007, Section 4) ,
The easy proof of the next lemma is omitted. 
Moreover, on their effective domains F m and F MV obey the identities
3)
Finally, denote by F MMV the monotone hull of the mean-variance preference,
Observe that F MMV restricted to L 2 is precisely the monotone mean-variance preference of Maccheroni et al. (2009) . In our seting the effective domain of the monotonization is naturally somewhat larger,
2.2. Price processes and admissible strategies. We assume there are d ∈ N risky assets and a risk-free bond with constant value 1. For more details concerning the next assumption see Biagini andČerný (2011, Section 2.4 Recall the definition of an absolutely continuous signed σ-martingale measure for S inČerný and Kallsen (2007, Definition 2.3). Denote the totality of such signed measures M s and the subsets containing only absolutely continuous (resp. equivalent) probability measures by M a (resp. M e ). Finally, for l ∈ {s, a, e} define
We say that ϑ ∈ L(S, P) is an admissible strategy -for the preference
2 . In this context we remark that the notion of admissibility in Bäuerle and Grether (2015) is unsatisfactory because it does not rule out doubling strategies, and therefore arbitrage, in continuous-time models. In particular, in their setting the Black-Scholes model is not arbitrage-free, see Harrison and Kreps (1979, Section 6 ).
We will work under the following no-arbitrage assumption, see alsoČerný and Kallsen 
Proof. The first statement follows fromČerný and Kallsen (2007, Lemma 2.4). The second statement follows from Theorem 2.1 and Propositions 3.5 and 5.3 in Biagini andČerný (2019) specialized to LÛ ∼ L 2 with the utility function
Although Definition 2.3 is a little narrower than the definition of tame strategies in Biagini andČerný (2019, Definition 5.1), the set of separating measures with density in L 2 remains the same, namely M a 2 , and all arguments in Biagini andČerný (2019) go through. See also Biagini andČerný (2011, Proposition 6.4).
New characterization of monotone mean-variance preferences
Let f , g be two concave, proper functions on L 0 . With Rockafellar (1970) we define the supremal convolution of f and g
One easily verifies that (2.1) means
The key mathematical observation is that supremal convolution is a commutative and associative operation, so that we obtain, with no additional effort,
Let us summarize the lessons from the commutative diagram (3.1).
(1) F is the expected quadratic utility with U(x) = x − x 2 /2 ; (2) F m is the expected truncated quadratic utility, see (2.3), with
(3) F MV is the mean-variance preference, see (2.4); (4) F MMV is the monotone mean-variance preference (2.5), now seen to be given equivalently by
The existing literature characterizes monotone mean-variance preferences mostly by the formula (2.5) or its variational counterpart (both restricted to L 2 , see Maccheroni et al., 2009 , equations 2.3-2.4) 
has a unique optimizerα > 0 obtained as the unique solution of
Furthermore,
. Under our integrability assumptions on X (2.3) and dominated convergence yield
The derivative f ′ is strictly decreasing on R + with f ′ > 0 near zero and f ′ < 0 near infinity. As f ′ is continuous on (0, ∞) it has a unique root f ′ (α) = 0 and by standard arguments this root is the global maximum of f on R + which proves (4.2). At the optimum the value function reads
Now, thanks to Assumption (4.1) we obtain SR m (X) = sup 
Observe that g : z → 1 − (1 + z 2 ) −1 is strictly increasing on R + with a continuous strictly increasing inverse function g
Therefore the left-hand side of (4.6) uniquely identifies SR(Z) if E[Z] ≥ 0.
Apply this observation to (4.5) to obtain SR m (X) = sup
where the last equality follows from (2.1) and (4.4). Observe that (4.2) implies
). This, (4.4), and (4.8) proves the first equality in (4.3). The second equality follows from homogeneity of the Sharpe ratio and the last from the inequality (4.5).
Remark 4.2. Identity (4.3) shows that the monotone Sharpe ratio SR m is equal to the 'arbitrage-adjusted Sharpe ratio' ofČerný (2003) for investment opportunities with positive mean and non-zero downside in L
2 . We also remark that the Sharpe ratio bound in the good-deal pricing methodology of Cochrane and Saá-Requejo (2000) is in reality an upper bound on the monotone Sharpe ratio SR m .
Optimal MMV investment and free cash flow streams
Denote the optimal strategies from Theorem 2.5 byθ x ∈ A andθ x m ∈ A m , respectively. Using the relations (3.1) we now study the optimal portfolio allocation for monotone mean-variance preferences
Observe that due to Assumption 2.4 and Theorem 2.5 one has
Theorem 5.1. Under Assumptions 2.2 and 2.4 one has
The optimal monotone mean-variance trading strategy in (5.1) equalŝ
Proof. From (3.1) and Theorem 2.5 we obtain
Due to the self-similarity of U m and the cone property of A m we have, just as inČerný et al. 
At the same time, (2.5) implies that
This provides an alternative characterization of the optimal strategy, obtained previously in Maccheroni et al. (2009, Theorem 4 .1) for a one-period model.
Mirroring the proof of Theorem 5.1 with standard MV preferences one obtains an analogous link between u(0) and u MV (0),
We are now in a position to formulate the main result on the availability of free cash-flow streams. To this end recall the function g −1 in (4.7).
Theorem 5.3. Under Assumptions 2.2 and 2.4 the following statements hold. (1) The highest Sharpe ratio attainable by a tame zero-cost strategy is arbitrarily close to and does not exceed 2u MV (0) . This Sharpe ratio is attained but not exceeded
in class A by the strategyθ 0 , 
The corresponding free terminal cash flow equals
Proof. Due to Jensen's inequality one can discard strategies with negative mean wealth. The proofs for zero mean wealth strategies are trivial hence we detail only the case where there exist strategies with positive (possibly infinite) mean and restrict attention only to those without further mention.
(1-2) Exploit the identities (4.6) and (4.8) with X = ϑ · S T . Observe that T , A , and A m are cones so multiplication by α > 0 maps these sets onto themselves. This yields (5.7) and (5.8). In ( (5) Argue by contradiction, assuming
. Now (4.3) with X =θ · S T and hypothesis yieldα > 0 such that The previous theorem shows that one cannot extract a free cash-flow stream (FCFS) in the market A m if and only if one cannot extract an FCFS from the mean-variance efficient portfolioθ 0 ∈ A. This is not entirely obvious in advance because first A m is a strict superset of A in general, and second in principle there could have been MV inefficient allocations in A that might have become very MV efficient after an FCFS extraction. Cui et al. (2012, Section 4) observe that a lognormal diffusion model does not allow a free cash-flow stream. The next corollary identifies two very generic situations where an FCFS is not available, cf. also Bäuerle and Grether (2015, Theorem 3.3 Proof. Under both hypotheses the variance-optimal measure is in M e 2 ; in the first case it follows by assumption and in the second it is the consequence of Theorem 1.3 in Delbaen and Schachermayer (1996) . Hence by item (4) of Theorem 5.3 u MV (0) = u MMV (0) and by item (5) any FCFS extraction must lead to a strictly lower maximal Sharpe ratio.
